Monday, October 21, 2013

Mental 06: The Morality of Abortion (01)

    I recently had an extended argument with someone who is pro-life/anti-abortion. The argument was not satisfactory, in part because of possibly irreconcilable starting assumptions about what constitutes a person1.) I was not able to convince this person to see the position in a new way, nor was I informed of any new arguments that could lead me to re-evaluate my own position, so I consider the discussion a failure. This does not, however, mean it was a waste of time - I will now use this material to state my case for why abortion is a morally acceptable choice for unwanted pregnancy. It involves a line of reasoning that is, to the best of my knowledge, relatively novel (certainly not one that exists in the popular debate about the subject.)

    Let us start with the evidence. First, it is absolutely certain that a fetus is a human being. At the moment of conception, it is genetically a human organism, a member of our species. But does this mean that a fetus is automatically a person? Should we afford a fetus the same rights as we do an adult human (in particular, the mother)?

    As far as personhood is concerned, I agree with Derek Parfit's modernization of Lock's definition of what it means to be a person: a thinking, rational being, capable of considering itself as such. In humans, this being appears to be a subset of the human animal, the functioning of the upper brain. This is the part of the brain that, as far as we know, has conscious experience, feels pain, and has all the characteristics we consider important in other people. This is also the part of the brain that is undeveloped in the first part of human development in the womb.

    Does a fetus feel pain? A brief2 survey of the evidence suggests not. Those who are against abortion will often argue that this is the case, and point to evidence that a fetus will actively struggle for life during an abortion. However, this appears to me only to be evidence that a fetus can detect "noxious stimuli". It does not mean that a fetus feels pain - an emotional, subjective experience - the same way that an adult or even child human does. A fetus has this behavior in common with almost all life - humans, yes, but also insects, bacteria, trees, fish, etc. I want stress I am not saying that a fetus is no better than an ant, only that the fact that struggling for life is not unique to a fetus, and if it were grounds for moral consideration, we would have to apply the same to almost all living things or be grossly inconsistent.

    One objection to this type of argument is that it resembles arguments made to perpetuate the idea of racial inferiority. After all, southern slave owners would probably have said that their slaves are not persons in the same way white persons are. If we find this reasoning unconvincing - nay, even abhorrent - why should we entertain a similar argument from pro-choice/pro-abortion groups?

    First, this objection does not counter the central problem the argument raises. If all living things deserve life and protection, regardless of their capacity to feel emotional pain or be persons, we are grossly inconsistent in our treatment of other life. More importantly, the objection fails to account for the real problem with arguments for racial inferiority - such arguments rely on false evidence. We know that there is no significant difference in a human being's capacity to be a person based only on their skin color. Furthermore, even if that were the case, and slaves were not fully people, their position as slaves and their treatment would still be cruel - we would today consider treating certain species like that (such as dogs, cats, etc) as animal cruelty.

    We very clearly treat individuals (humans and animals alike) differently according to their capacity to be a person. Children are not afforded the full rights of adults, for their own protection. The same is true for the elderly who have lost major brain functioning and those with developmental challenges. We treat them with compassion, we treat them kindly (or should anyway) but we do treat them differently.

    One last objection, which I will not spend too much time on, is that the science we use to determine how capable an individual is of being a person is biased and unreliable. The Nazi's had their scientists, after all. I am going to guess that such claims do not usually come from those genuinely concerned about scientific methodology but are instead seeking a reason to discount evidence they disagree with. This is based on my informal observation that these objections are almost never followed with alternative scientific explanations. I do not believe that there is some conspiracy by scientists to encourage mothers to "murder their babies", as I do not see what anyone could gain by this (whereas, for example, Nazis and slave owners had much to gain). However, if you have any evidence regarding this I would entertain it.

    In the next part I will address a much stronger objection to these arguments - that it is not life in general but human life specifically that ought to be protected, and thus the slippery slope to protecting all life does not follow.


1: And in part because I believe the other party did not wish to participate in a rational debate. I hate to sound so conceited, but in my defense I do not use the word "rational" when I merely mean "agrees with me."
2: Very brief: please feel free to point me to more, supporting either position.

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